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Introduction 
The opening line of Horkheimer-Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment reads, "Enlightenment has always aimed at 
liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet 
the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant".1 This path 
of enlightenment is what the interpretations found in Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Horkheimer-Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment have in common. Considered in terms of their broad 
outlines, these interpretations are the same. They differentiate 
themselves from one another only in the details. The conceptions 
of the enlightenment process in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
and Horkheimer-Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment are like 
perpendicular lines; they begin at the same point and then proceed 
to move further and further apart. However, even as they move 
apart, both conceptions still point back to their common origin, 
and no matter how far from that original point they move, one can 
still draw two parallel lines that relate them, one connecting the 
perpendicular lines, the other bisecting their point of origin. What 
I propose to do in this paper is draw a series of such parallel lines 
in the hopes of reaching the common point of origin: the concept 
of enlightenment. I will begin at the limit of enlightenment, the 
border where enlightenment crosses over into barbarism, and work 
my way back, step by step, line by line, from the limits of 
enlightenment to its public face, to its positive aspect, to its negative 
aspect, and finally to the very heart of enlightenment as conceived 
by Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno. In the end, I believe, it will be 
shown that, while Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno have different 
interpretations of how enlightenment plays itself out, they start 
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from the same fundamental concept of enlightenment. Along the 
way, it will, of course, have to be explained how and where Hegel 
and Horkheimer-Adorno diverge in their ideas on enlightenment. 
Limits of Enlightenment: Terror and Anti-Semitism 
Formally, the limits of enlightenment that Hegel and 
Horkheimer-Adorno posit are as different as can be. In Hegel, 
enlightenment reaches its limit in the Terror, where enlightenment 
becomes an orgy of violence, a fulfillment of the Hobbesian bellum 
omnes contra omnia. Enlightenment breaks down into pure and 
utter chaos. For Horkheimer-Adorno, on the other hand, 
enlightenment reaches its limit in the Nazi death camps. Here the 
process of the rationalization of means has come to its extreme. 
The most enlightened techniques are needed to put as many people 
to death as quickly and efficiently as possible. In Auschwitz, there 
was no frenzy, no orgy of violence. Describing the fascist-political 
anti-Semite, Adorno says, 
He is cold, without affections, and is perhaps the most merciless 
of all [anti-Semites]. He deals with anti-Semitism as an export 
article. He has no immediate gratification from the persecution 
of the Jews, and if he has, it is only incidental. He deliberately 
plans [the Jews'] annihilation. He fulfills his task by 
administrative measures without any personal contact with the 
victims. He does not have to hate the Jews; he is able to negotiate 
with foreign ones most amiably. To him anti-Semitism is reified. 
It must function.2 
There was a timetable, a schedule of showers and cremations that 
had to be stuck to. Formally, these effects are different; one is 
utter chaos, the other is the epitome of order. Materially, however, 
the limit of enlightenment is the same in Hegel and Horkheimer-
Adorno: lots and lots of dead people. 
What is the Terror? Death on a mass scale. But not merely 
death. Meaningless death. As Hegel says, "It is the coldest and 
meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a 
head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water". 3 A French 
peasant who died during the Revolution itself at least had the 
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consolation that he died in battle against the ancien regime. But 
during the Terror, one dies for wearing the wrong color socks, for 
reading the wrong books, for having a name that sounds vaguely 
royal. The Terror is what happens when absolute freedom becomes 
"merely the fury of destruction".4 
But while the Terror simply means death in its material aspect, 
formally there is much more to it. There is, for example, the constant 
uncertainty that characterizes the Terror in the eyes of its victims. 
In this sense, the Terror is a return to the state of the master-slave 
wherein the slave confronts the very real possibility of his/her own 
death at every moment. The French citizen, living through the 
Terror, has experienced "the absolute melting-away of everything 
stable". 5 Or, as Shklar put it, "From having been a perfectly 
autonomous master, the revolutionary has now become the utterly 
instrumental servant". 6 Only for this citizen the uncertainty is 
actually worse; at his/her lowest, the slave could still depend on 
one bit of stability, the master. Even as the slave's life is forfeit to 
the whims of the master, it is at least certain that the master and 
only the master can take the slave's life. The citizen living under 
the Terror, however, has not even this assurance. S/he knows that 
his/her life depends on whomever happens to be in power now, 
but who that is changes constantly. Even the identity of one's 
potential executioner is no longer stable under the Terror. 
For Horkheimer-Adorno, the limit of enlightenment is reached 
at the gates of Auschwitz. Beneath the dictum "Arbeit Macht Frei*\ 
a dictum that has strangely Hegelian-Marxian overtones, the 
victims of the Holocaust learned the true meaning of those words. 
Work makes humans free, free to be tools. Here the process reveals 
its inherent flaw. Enlightenment is the attempt to master nature, to 
free human beings from its grasp. The attempt, however, ends by 
mastering both nature and humanity; everything becomes a tool, a 
thing to be made useful or thrown out. In the death camps, the line 
which enlightenment has tried to maintain between objects and 
persons is obliterated. Persons become objects for manipulation 
and destruction. "Everything must be used and all must obey". 7 
This obliteration is perhaps best exemplified in the ritual that prisoners 
arriving at the camps had to endure. The arriving prisoners would line 
up and doctors would separate out those who could work from those 
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who could not. Those who could work, did. Those who could not, 
died. One was either useful or sent to the showers. "The Jews are 
marked out as the absolute objects of domination pure and simple".8 
This orderliness of the executions points to a key difference 
be tween Horkhe imer -Adorno ' s account of the l imits of 
enlightenment and Hegel's. For the victims of the Nazi death camps, 
unlike the victims of the guillotine, there was very little uncertainty 
about their fate. "Every 'other' person who 'doesn't know his place' 
must be forced back within his proper confines—those of 
unrestricted terror". 9 Once one had reached the camp, it was little 
more than a question of time before one died. The question for the 
guillotined was "Will?" "Will I be next? Will they come for me 
tomorrow? The day after? Next week? Never? Will I survive?" In 
the death camps, the question was not "Will?" but "When?" "When 
will I die? When will they send me to the crematorium? When will 
I be shot? When will I finally die?" If the Nazis themselves did not 
send one to the gallows or the showers, there was starvation, 
fatigue, disease, and a plethora of other causes that would lead to 
one's death. There was no uncertainty in the death camps about 
one's fate; only about the means. 
The meaninglessness of the deaths in the Terror provides a 
link to Horkheimer-Adorno's account of the Holocaust. The orgy 
that Hegel describes and the factory of Horkheimer-Adorno share 
this much in common: each death is, taken in itself, meaningless. 
The reasons for the violence are merely rationalizations. The acts 
themselves are not even motivated by hatred; in one case they are 
simply the only way for all to be socially useful, in the other they 
are simply tasks to be carried out. The frenzy must be sated, the 
quota must be filled. With whose blood, with whose corpses, is a 
matter of indifference. The aristocrats, the enemies of the 
revolution, the insane, the Jews. It is all one. These deaths, brought 
about in different ways and under different rationalizations, all 
represent enlightenment's failed attempt to actualize itself. The 
gui l lo t ine and the showers are both the end resul ts of 
enlightenment's attempt to transplant heaven to the earth below. 1 0 
But how could it end this way? How could the enlightenment end 
in such atrocities? Why did enlightenment end with humanity 
"sinking into a new kind of barbarism"?" To answer this would be 
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to state fully what enlightenment is, which I am not yet prepared 
to do. However, there is a partial answer to be found in what Hegel 
and Horkheimer-Adorno hold in common about the limits of 
enlightenment that will take us a step closer to the full truth of 
enlightenment. That commonality is simply this: in both the Terror 
and the Holocaust, humanity is treated simply as a means. 
Faces of Enlightenment: 
Absolute Freedom and the Culture Industry 
Humanity however does not become degraded to mere means 
by the public faces of enlightenment, which I will now consider. 
Once we approach the limits of enlightenment, the transition of 
humanity into a means has long since taken place. The question 
for now is not how does humanity come to be a means, but rather, 
in considering the public faces of enlightenment—absolute freedom 
for Hegel, the culture industry for Horkheimer-Adorno—the 
question that must be asked is simply this: man is a means to what 
end? What is the task for which humanity is presented as the proper 
tool? The culture industry is rationalized, absolute control. Absolute 
freedom is the complete lack of control. Here it seems that rather 
than showing how Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno have moved 
closer together in their interpretations of enlightenment, we have 
shown how they have moved farther apart. When considering the 
limits of enlightenment, we have at least the material effects, the 
body counts and the meaninglessness of the deaths, that are 
comparable. There is a similarity, however. Absolute freedom is 
the freedom to decide what, and who, is useful. It is the freedom to 
decide this not merely for oneself, but for society as a whole. What 
Hegel sees as the dream of the Revolution is what Horkheimer-
Adorno see as the reality of the culture industry. The culture 
industry shapes thought in such a way that nothing is useless. The 
leisure that human beings are allowed by their masters is turned 
against them and used to enslave them all the more firmly. The 
culture industry, or rather those who control it, decide for everyone 
what, and who, is useful. 
Absolute freedom, in Hegel's sense, comes about when every 
individual consciousness may set the goals and values of the entire 
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society. This ability expresses itself primarily in determining who 
and what has social utility. That is, who serves the common good 
and who does not. The key to absolute freedom is that each 
individual member of society is capable of making this 
determination, a determination which, by its very nature, effects 
the whole of society. This absolute freedom breaks down into the 
Terror when these decisions come into more and more intense 
conflict, to the point where faction after faction is claiming to be 
the voice of the general will and, in turn, executing their political 
and personal enemies for the common good. In considering absolute 
freedom, one can easily see how it could break down like this. If I, 
speaking on behalf of the general will, declare Fred to be an enemy 
of the people, and Fred, likewise speaking on behalf of the general 
will, declares me to be a traitor to the revolution, we have an 
apparent problem. For our claims to be speaking on behalf of the 
general will are not delusional; they are true. But if they are both 
true, then we must both be sent to the guillotine. I have obviously 
declared Fred to be a defective member of society, and he has 
done so to me. And both claims are true. Therefore, the faulty 
parts of society, Fred and myself, must be gotten rid of. But this is 
true not merely for criminals like Fred and I. After all, what each 
consciousness determines is social utility, not merely social 
detriment. So, a citizen who has done nothing actually contrary to 
his station may still be sent to the guillotine for any number of 
reasons. Perhaps s/he did not contribute enough to the veterans' 
fund, or was a bit late returning a library book, or was a minute 
late for guard duty. To the guillotine with them! This is why Shklar 
declares that "The only possible action of completely universal 
participation is 'negative action'". 1 2 
Absolute freedom is a prelude to the Terror. The culture 
industry is not, however, a prelude to the Holocaust. But the reason 
that absolute freedom is a prelude to the Terror is because it presents 
in theory what the Terror will later put into practice. Similarly, the 
culture industry presents the theoretical justification of fascism. 
Where absolute freedom allows each to speak on behalf of all, the 
culture industry allows some to speak on behalf of themselves and 
pretend they are speaking on behalf of all. But this is not all. The 
real key to the culture industry lies not in pretense, but in 
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manipulation. The culture industry is make-believe in the truest 
sense; it makes us believe. "The whole world is made to pass 
through the filter of the culture industry" 1 3. The goal of the culture 
industry is to make us see ourselves, as well as our fellow human 
beings, as industry sees us: as customers and employees 1 4. If the 
Nazi death camps represent the extreme limit of enlightenment, 
then the culture industry is the point we reach when that limit is 
on the horizon. The culture industry is, in Horkheimer-Adorno's 
eyes, nothing but the pure manipulation of human beings. "The 
culture industry as a whole has molded men as a type unfailingly 
reproduced in every product". 1 5 It serves, not so much to treat 
humans as tools for given ends, as the death camps do, but to remind 
us that we are tools, to prepare us to be nothing but tools. 
"Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work". 1 6 
There is a horrid B-grade science fiction movie from the 1980's 
entitled "Future War" in which the main character, when asked 
who he is, simply repeats "I am tool". The goal of the culture 
industry is to shape human consciousnesses in such a way that 
such self- images become standard. The purpose of each 
commercial, movie, television program and pop-song is to remind 
each of us of our function: we are tools, of importance only to the 
extent that we are useful as producers and consumers. 
Absolute freedom allows each to decide the good for all. The 
culture industry robs us of the ability to decide at all. How are 
they connected? To answer this question we must first answer the 
question with which we ended the previous section: how do human 
beings become means to ends? For the common point between 
absolute freedom and the culture industry lies not in their objects 
nor even in their methods, it lies in a boundary which both have 
crossed. The boundary is the line drawn between humanity as an 
end in itself and humanity as a means to an end. This line is crossed, 
as I will argue in the next section, when enlightenment is forced to 
give itself a positive content. The common point between absolute 
freedom and the culture industry is the positive content of 
enlightenment. When the individual consciousness is granted the 
ability to determine questions for the whole of society, it determines 
what is useful for society. When the culture industry infects the 
minds of the masses, it infects them with notions of being of use to 
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society, of functioning properly. The hero is he who assures that 
the machine works properly. As was suggested earlier, humanity 
is a means. It is now time to explore exactly how this state of 
affairs comes about. How does humanity become a mere means to 
an end? 
What is Enlightenment? Positively 
We are now prepared to look at the positive content of 
enlightenment. Here we are drawing closer to our goal. We have 
moved in from the fringes of the phenomenon, closer to its core. 
What enlightenment posits in Hegel is intimately related to what 
it posits in Horkheimer-Adorno. In the one case, enlightenment 
posits utility, usefulness for the social whole, as its positive content. 
In Horkheimer-Adorno, however, it is not utility that enlightenment 
puts forth, but that form of thinking, means-end thinking, or in 
their phrase, instrumental reason. The positive content of Hegel's 
enlightenment asks, "Is that good for society? Is it useful for the 
social whole?" Instrumental reason asks a related, though somewhat 
broader question: What is that good for? How is that useful? Thus 
at their cores, utility and instrumental reason are the same: they 
deny that a given object or person may have any kind of intrinsic 
value. Everything and everyone can have value only as a means to 
some external end. 
Utility is the judgment on an object's or a person's contribution 
toward the good of society. "Just as everything is useful to man, so 
man is useful too, and his vocation is to make himself a member 
of the group, of use for the common good and serviceable to all". 1 7 
Everything and everyone must be made useful for society. What 
does useful mean? According to Shklar, "Whatever pleases men 
most is most useful for all". 1 8 Shklar holds that Hegel's utility is 
quite in line with Benthamite utilitarianism. While this holds true 
in the sense that both ideas of "utility" provide maximizing 
principles of evaluation, that is where the similarity ends. For Hegel 
is here using the term utility, I believe, in a sense that is more 
inspired by the same man whose thought inspired the French 
revolutionaries, Rousseau. What matters is not pleasure, but good. 
To argue with Shklar that utility is simply maximal pleasure is to 
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forget the republican aspects of the movement Hegel is describing. 
A person or thing is useful to society, not to the extent that s/he or 
it gives people pleasure, but to the extent that s/he or it makes 
people good. Hence the guillotine, which gives very few any 
pleasure, is of the highest utility, and the person whose head rolls 
away from the platform has been made as useful as s/he could be, 
as an example to others. The problem for enlightenment arises 
insofar as utility for the common good, usefulness to society, is an 
all too abstract idea. While it may easily be used negatively, to 
weed out elements that are actively damaging society, the common 
good proves a rather hollow idol when one attempts to use the 
concept to provide a goal. Thus absolute freedom which is the 
ability of each to determine the good for the whole, can end only 
in universal negation, in the Terror. 
Instrumental reason arises from the attempt to master nature. 
It is distinguished from utility in Hegel's sense in that, while utility 
posits a goal, an end for which things are to be made useful, 
instrumental reason is simply the form of thought which treats 
things and persons as no more than means to ends. What the ends 
are is essentially irrelevant. Pleasure? Fine. Profitability? That 
works, too. Control? Why not? What matters to instrumental reason 
is not what a given object is useful for, but simply that it is useful. 
Hence it is not important to instrumental reason what the effects, 
psychological or physical, of the Nazi gas chambers are on their 
victims, but it is important that they produce in the most efficient 
way possible. Thus the story, whether true or fictional, that the 
Nazis switched to gas chambers after it was decided that they would 
be a cheaper means of carrying out genocide, coincides perfectly 
with instrumental reason. As Horkheimer-Adorno say, "Reason is 
the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral in regard to 
ends". 1 9 Enlightenment, when it is forced to give itself a positive 
content cannot, in Horkheimer-Adorno's eyes, even go so far as 
Hegel claims it does. Enlightenment cannot posit a substantial goal, 
such as being useful to the community, at all. Instead it can only 
posit a form: utility, in the most abstract possible sense. "The means 
is fetishized". 2 0 
Utility and instrumental reason, while obviously connected, 
are hardly the same. The primary difference lies in the notion of 
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an end. For Hegel's notion of utility there is a set end, the good of 
the community however vaguely conceived. Instrumental reason, 
however, has no such end and no way of setting one. A thing that 
is deemed useful, in Hegel's sense, is deemed useful for the 
community. For Horkheimer-Adorno, however, a thing is useful 
for whatever arbitrary goal has already been set. If that goal is the 
good of the community, fine. If it is not, if the goal is instead the 
destruction of the community, that is fine also. What Hegel sees as 
the positive content of enlightenment provides some material end, 
no matter how vaguely conceived. Horkheimer-Adorno's positive 
content of enlightenment is merely a formal type of thinking, 
considering everything as means to indifferent ends. The world 
has become a workshop. 
This becomes very intriguing when we compare the reasons 
for enlightenment's positive content. In Hegel, the enlightenment 
must replace the faith that it has destroyed with something. As he 
says, "If all prejudices and superstition have been banished, the 
question arises, What next? What is the truth Enlightenment has 
propagated in their stead?"2* The answer we receive from Hegel 
is simply utility. In Horkheimer-Adorno, however, enlightenment 
has always been instrumental reason. The end always remains the 
same: preservation. "Its principles are the principles of self-
preservation". 2 2 This comes out most clearly, perhaps, in the first 
excursus of Dialectic of Enlightenment. In the interpretation of 
the Odyssey, Odysseus is willing to do anything to preserve his 
own life. His vaunted cunning is simply instrumental reason. He 
gladly renounces his identity, only to preserve it, in the episode 
with the Cyclops. In dealing with the Sirens, he renounces his 
own freedom by having himself tied to the mast of the ship, in 
order that he might cheat the Sirens by hearing their song without 
falling prey to them. With Circe and the Lotus-eaters, he renounces 
pleasure to preserve himself. Every act of preservation requires 
two poles: the object (in Odysseus's case, Odysseus) to be preserved 
and the threat from which it must be preserved. What is this threat? 
In Hegel's account, enlightenment gives itself positive content once 
its negative content has been exhausted. In Horkheimer-Adorno, 
enlightenment is characterized by nothing more than the attempt 
to preserve humanity from some threat. It does this by attempting 
Dialectic and Enlightenment 53 
to overcome the threat, to control it. But still we have not answered 
the key question, the final puzzle piece that will show us to the 
core of enlightenment: what is the other of enlightenment? 
What is Enlightenment? Negatively 
Enlightenment, in both Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno, 
initially defines itself based on what it specifically is not. There is 
always an other for enlightenment which gives it its initial content. 
To put this in what # i ' ek calls "Hegelese", enlightenment begins 
its life as a determinate negation. In Hegel, at least, Enlightenment 
only begins to posit its own content once it has exhausted its 
negative content; that is, only once it has completed the 
annihilation/assimilation of its other. Initially, enlightenment is 
"wholly dependent for its system of beliefs on the faith of its 
opponent. It simply says 'no ' to every 'yes '" . 2 3 Enlightenment has 
what it thinks to be a single task that can be completed, what Hegel 
calls its struggle with superstition. For Horkheimer-Adorno, 
however, enlightenment can never escape its other. This is true in 
Hegel as well, but for Hegel enlightenment never realizes this fact. 
Once enlightenment has destroyed the old form of faith, it believes 
itself to have overcome faith itself. 
In Hegel, we must sort out what enlightenment believes itself 
to be renouncing and what it is renouncing. Enlightenment takes 
its opposite to be Aberglaube (superstition), when in fact it is 
Glaube (faith, belief). I mention the German terms because the 
English words do not, to my mind, properly convey the relation 
between the two concepts. The prefix that transforms faith into 
superstition is the German aber, the German word for "but". So 
Aber-glaube can be seen as belief in spite of, the holding of a 
belief in the face of tremendous evidence to the contrary. I do not 
think that this fully comes across in the translations. The concept 
of superstition in the English-speaking world, after all, has 
something of a quaint quality to it. We modern human beings still 
have our superstitions, superstitions which we acknowledge to be 
superstitions but nevertheless uphold. Lucky charms, rituals, 
astrology, black cats and Friday the 13 , h's represent the superstitions 
of our day, but they are not Aberglauben. They are half-believed, 
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half sustained by habit, and the evidence against them is 
acknowledged. Aberglauben, on the other hand, are not merely 
believed in the face of evidence to the contrary, the more evidence 
there is, the greater the conviction becomes. Aberglaube is, rather 
than simple superstition, obstinate belief. It is credens quia absurdum 
est. The type of belief, with its low level of conviction, sustained by 
superstition would hardly be worth the attention of enlightenment 
forces. Aberglaube is the way that enlightenment views faith, Glaube. 
The attack leveled by enlightenment against superstition/faith 
is threefold. First, enlightenment claims that the object of faith is 
simply an anthropomorphic projection. As Horkheimer-Adorno 
would later point out, this argument of enlightenment is as old as 
Xenophanes. 2 4 For Hegel, this is a misguided attack, not so much 
because it is wrong, but because faith is well aware of this aspect 
of itself When enlightenment points out that faith's acts of worship 
center around earthly objects, and believers appear to be worshiping 
sticks and rocks, which merely points up of the fact that the 
believing consciousness is a consciousness divided. Secondly, 
enlightenment attacks the justifications of faith. Here faith is safe, 
so long as it does not try to justify itself using the tools of 
enlightenment. The final front on which enlightenment attacks faith 
is in terms of faith's actions. Faith's retort is simply to accept this 
criticism and shake its head at the poor enlightenment, which 
cannot see beyond the sticks and rocks to the actual objects of 
worship. As Hyppolite says, "The mistake of the Enlightenment 
was to offer a merely negative critique, to fail to grasp the content 
of faith". 2 5 From all of these attacks, faith is protected so long as it 
does not allow itself to engage enlightenment on its own grounds. 
That is, faith is invincible, so long as it does not attempt to rationally 
defend itself. Once that happens, faith "has already let itself be 
corrupted by the Enlightenment", 2 6 and what enlightenment is 
confronting is no longer faith, but enl ightenment itself. 
Enlightenment cannot confront faith directly, because faith as such 
is incomprehensible to enlightenment. Before the struggle between 
faith and enlightenment begins, faith must be transfigured into 
enlightenment; it must see itself as enlightenment sees it and 
attempt to defend itself in the same manner, using the same weapons 
with which enlightenment has attacked it. 
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In addition to being simply obstinate belief, enlightenment's 
label of superstition has a personalized, conspiratorial aspect. It is 
not simply a matter of people believing falsely; they are being led 
to believe falsely. Enlightenment sees in faith an element of 
duplicity. Believers are being deceived by someone. This, Hegel 
says, is the essence of enlightenment's misunderstanding of faith. 
Because, had enlightenment understood faith for what is was, then 
it would have understood that for faith to be deception was 
impossible. Faith, in its essence, is the object of a people's (Volk) 
consciousness. Here Hegel very plainly anticipates Feuerbach's 
interpretation of religion. 
The other of enlightenment in Horkheimer-Adorno is 
ostensibly myth. That is, just as enlightenment in Hegel takes its 
other to be superstition when it is in fact faith, the enlightenment 
for Horkheimer-Adorno takes its other to be myth, when it is in 
fact something else. In Horkheimer-Adorno's tale, enlightenment 
does not simply attack myth. Rather the attack is a continuous 
process. The essence of Horkheimer-Adorno's interpretation of 
the Odyssey is that each of Odysseus's adventures relates the 
confrontation between myth and enlightenment. Odysseus is, of 
course, enlightenment reason personified. Each of the perils he 
faces represents a different aspect of the mythical world, that is, a 
different threat to enlightenment. The Cyclops represents 
unenlightened humanity, beings essentially human but who do not 
have to work or organize in order to survive. The Cyclopes are 
humanity without civilization. Circe and the Lotus-Eaters represent 
the threat of regression to the pre-enlightened past. Circe threatens 
to regress Odysseus to a purely anima state if he yields to her. The 
Lotus-Eaters tempt Odysseus and his crew with what may be the 
greatest danger to enlightenment: lack of purpose. Those who eat 
the lotus flowers forget all their goals, their ambition, even the 
ambition to preserve themselves, leaves them. The Sirens also 
represent the threat of a kind of regression. Their song lures sailors 
with the temptation of forgiveness and forgetfulness. It seems worth 
noting that of all the threats Odysseus encounters, only the Cyclops 
seems to be an active threat. Circe, the Lotus-Eaters, and the Sirens 
are all temptations for the enlightened self. The Cyclops, and the 
Cyclops alone, presents a danger not to the enlightened self, but to 
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the actual life of that self. Perhaps this is because the Cyclops is 
seen as an earlier version of the human being. This creature, while 
slow-witted and uncivilized, must at least be active in order to be 
related to the enlightened self. Enlightenment is constantly fleeing 
from myth. But what enlightenment fails to realize is that in its 
flight it is also returning to myth. "Myth is already enlightenment, 
and enlightenment reverts to mythology" 2 7. Myth is not, in fact, 
the antithesis of enlightenment; it is merely another form of 
enlightenment, of what enlightenment is at its essence. 
The true other of enlightenment in Horkheimer-Adorno is 
simply nature; the alien forces of wind and water, air and fire that 
lord over humankind for most of its pre-history. Enlightenment 
aims at freeing humanity from nature, not from myth. The only 
problem that enlightenment has with myth is that it failed to 
accomplish the goal of enlightenment. Myth was unable to complete 
its task, enlightenment's task, the mastery of nature. This is why 
myth and enlightenment are the same. Myth is simply an older, 
less effective version of enlightenment. Myth is the beta-release 
of enlightenment. It is also why Horkheimer-Adorno chose Sir 
Francis Bacon as their spokesman of enlightenment, rather than 
Voltaire or Kant. Bacon blatantly represents knowledge as simply 
a means for controlling nature. This attempt, in all situations, to 
control nature is what gives rise to the positive content of 
enlightenment, to instrumental reason. 
We have a pair of odd triangles here. Enlightenment, in Hegel, 
describes its enemy as one thing, superstition, when it is in fact 
another, faith; furthermore this other is, in essence, the same as 
enlightenment. In Horkheimer-Adorno, on the other hand, 
enlightenment describes its enemy as one thing, myth, when it is 
in fact another, nature; but enlightenment is not, as in Hegel, the 
same as the third point of this triangle. Instead, enlightenment is, 
for Horkheimer-Adorno, the same as what it actually takes to be 
its other. Being the same, myth and enlightenment share a single 
other: nature. Our question must now become why? Why are faith 
and nature seen as others of enlightenment? What is it about 
enlightenment that makes faith appear as superstition, and nature 
appear as purely hostile? Why must enlightenment negate these 
others? The answer will take us to the very nucleus of the concept 
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of enlightenment. We are now finally prepared to pose the question: 
what is enlightenment? 
The Concept of Enlightenment 
We have thus far learned that enlightenment discovers its limits 
in the reign of meaningless death, that the key to that limit is the 
use of humanity as a means, that when enlightenment is forced to 
give itself positive content, it poses either utility, an abstract of 
community good, or instrumental reason, simple means-ends 
thinking, as that content, that the initial impetus of enlightenment 
consists in the negation of what it takes to be its other, and that the 
target of enlightenment in its determinate negation is nothing more 
or less that enlightenment itself. We appear to be well prepared to 
take on the quest ions, so famously posed by Berlinische 
Monatsschrift in 1783 and answered above all by Kant of what is 
enlightenment. The answer that Kant posed was that enlightenment 
was "mankind s exit from its self-incurred immaturity".28 Maturity 
in Kant's sense means no more than the ability to use one's own 
reason, without the guidance of any kind of authority. But to use 
one's reason to do what? Again, Kant supplies the answer. He 
claims, "Sapere audel Have the courage to use your own 
understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment". 2 9 Sapere audel 
Dare to know! But dare to know what? And to what end? And how 
are we to understand understanding here? The last question is the 
key to answering the other two. Knowledge, in Kant's sense, means 
no more or less than the kind of systematic, scientific knowledge 
that enlightenment thinkers have always reveled in. Thus, to the 
question what is it that we are commanded to dare to know, the 
answer is simply facts, facts of all shapes and sizes, facts about 
people, places, and things, facts about flowers, weeds, and trees, 
facts about lions, tigers, and bears. For what purpose ought we to 
gather these facts? To use them, of course. In the arsenal of 
enlightenment, facts constitute one more kind of weapon against 
the eternal enemy, faith or nature. Thus we reach the heart of 
enlightenment and we find there an ugly little beast: positivism. 
This is the essence of enlightenment, in both its positive and 
negative aspects. But positivism in what sense? What is meant 
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here by positivism is not the simplistic worship of facts, as 
undertaken by the logical positivists. Rather it is the implication 
of that style of "thought" that members of the Frankfurt School 
relished pointing out: to affirm individual facts is likewise to affirm 
the world in which they exist, and all that is evil therein. This 
affirmation (in the derogatory Frankfurt sense) is the heart of 
enlightenment. This we can see even in the name of the process. 
To enlighten, to shed light on. Aufklären, to clear up, to make clear. 
Shedding light on the world leaves the world essentially unchanged. 
Explaining the causes and conditions of pain and suffering in no 
way entails alleviating or eliminating pain and suffering. 
Enlightenment, like any tool, is essentially indifferent to the ends 
for which it is used. The doctor who has learned the best ways to 
prevent death has likewise learned the best ways to inflict it. 
But enlightenment positivism, like other forms of positivism, 
seeks the facts about every case except its own. Enlightenment 
will register the facts and seek the causes of each and every thing 
in the universe, except for its own desire to collect facts and find 
causes. Hence enlightenment positivism is a blind positivism. The 
true motto of enlightenment is not, as Kant claimed, "Sapere 
audeP\ but instead the statement he made later on in that celebrated 
essay. "Argue, as much as you want and about whatever you want, 
but obey!"30 We may question anything, argue about anything, save 
enlightenment itself. Thus the true failing of enlightenment is not 
in the quest for knowledge, a quest that Hegel and Horkheimer-
Adorno can hardly reject, but that it sets limits on its own 
knowledge. As Hegel says, "Enlightenment declares to be an error 
and a fiction is the very same thing as Enlightenment itself is". 3 1 
Or again with Horkheimer-Adorno, "Enlightenment must consider 
itself, if men are not to be wholly betrayed". 3 2 Enlightenment, to 
actually achieve itself, must be made reflexive. It must be turned 
back upon itself, must turn its desire for knowledge against itself. 
This is what critics of enlightenment, from Hegel to Nietzsche to 
Horkheimer-Adorno have sought to do. Without this element, 
enlightenment itself becomes a tool, serving the powers that be to 
preserve the order that is. If enlightenment achieves self-reflection, 
it may be able to achieve human liberation. 
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Conclusion 
To put the preceding argument into its proper order, 
enlightenment begins, in both Hegel and Horkheimer-Adorno, as 
pure positivism. The break in the development from the concept 
of enlightenment to its limits occurs in the next stage, when 
enlightenment confronts its other. Both Hegel and Horkheimer-
Adorno see that enlightenment always already is what it takes to 
be its other. Hegel is content to point out that what enlightenment 
takes to be its other, superstition, is in fact merely an aspect of 
something else, faith, which is enlightenment. Horkheimer-Adomo, 
however, see that behind what enlightenment takes to be its other, 
myth, there lies its true other, nature. From this distinction, different 
positive contents are proposed for enlightenment; utility for Hegel 
and instrumental reason for Horkheimer-Adorno. Utility and 
instrumental reason then provide the public faces of enlightenment 
in absolute freedom and the culture industry. These public facades 
then collapse into the Terror and the Holocaust. 
The argument presented here is far from complete. Beyond 
the complexities in both Hegel 's and Horkheimer-Adorno's 
accounts of enlightenment that had to be passed over due to a lack 
of time and space, there are further points which would have to be 
taken into consideration in thinking about the conditions that give 
rise to enlightenment and the aftermath of enlightenment. Further, 
some degree of injustice has been done to both Hegel and 
Horkheimer-Adorno in the preceding argument. For both 
interpretations, much of the complexity and detail has had to be 
passed over. And for Horkheimer-Adorno in particular, an injustice 
has been done by the very structure of the preceding account. In 
presenting Dialectic of Enlightenment as a sustained narrative, I 
have presented what is, as the subtitle indicates, a book of 
fragments, as something much more systematic than it actually is. 
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